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M. R. Goode*

Corporate Conspiracy:
Problems of Mens Rea And the
Parties to the Agreement

1. Introduction
The essence of conspiracy is the agreement or plot formed between
two or more parties. 1 Thus, in R. v. Aspinall, for example, Brett J.
A. said: ". . . . the crime of conspiracy is completely committed, if
it is committed at all, the moment two or more have agreed that they
will do, at once and at some future time, certain things." 2 It follows
that criminal conspiracy may be loosely defined as a criminal
contract: an agreement between two or more "persons". 3 Emphasis
will be placed upon the elements of that required agreement in the
discussion that follows. First, there is the subjective element, which
may be defined as the need for a conspiratorial mens rea,
constituting agreement. In the context of corporate conspiracy, the
question is whether a company can be said to have mens rea for
these purposes. Second, there is the objective element, which may
be defined as the need for two or more "persons". In the context of
corporate conspiracy, the question is whether and by what means a
company may be regarded as a person capable of agreement. It is
this latter element which may be referred to as the requirement of
"plurality". 4

*M. R. Goode, Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. This is axiomatic. See, for example, Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies
and Agreements (Philadelphia: Blackstone Pub. Co., at 54; Harrison, Conspiracy
as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1924) at
63; Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (London: Stevens, 2nd
ed., 1961) at 669-70; Tremeear's Annotated Criminal Code (Toronto: Carswell,
6th ed., 1964) at 639; Cousens, "Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy" (1937),
23 Va.L.R. 898; Note, "Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy" (1959),
72 H.L.R. 920 at 935-40; Powell, "Conspiracy Prosecutions" (1970), 13 Crim. L.
Q. 34 at 34-36; Mulcahy v. R. (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 300; R. v. O'Brien [1954]
S.C.R. 666, 110 C.C.C. 1, 19 C.R. 371, [195512 D.L.R. 311.
2. (1876), 2 Q.B.D. 48 at 58.
3. Supra, note 1. In the area of corporate conspiracy, see Rahl, "Conspiracy and
the Anti-Trust Laws" (1950), 44 III.L.R. 743 at 752.
4. Problems of plurality also arise where a husband and wife are accused of
conspiracy, and also where one of two conspirators is acquitted of the crime. On
both topics, see The English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 50,
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In order to explore the problems raised by the application of the
law of criminal conspiracy to a company, it is necessary to explore
both subjective and objective elements of the question. The
discussion which follows begins with an overview of the general
principles of corporate criminal responsibility which relate to the
attribution of the subjective element to an artificial legal
personality. These general principles lead to a discussion of the
objective plurality element, which will be developed in the context
of technical problems which arise where it is alleged that a company
has conspired with its sole owner and director. Discussion will then
turn to the special legal problems relating to conspiracy and
employees generally, conspiracy and the multicorporate enterprise,
and the general utility of the crime in relation to the company.
2. The Subjective Element: Attribution of Mens Rea to the
Company
(A) Development of the Identification Theory
Early in the twentieth century, it was usually held that a company
could commit some crimes, but could commit no crime that
involved mens rea. Illustrative of this early law in the area of
conspiracy is R. v. Kellow, in which Cussen J. held:" It is not
necessary to decide absolutely that nuisance and libel are the only
crimes for which a corporation can be indicted. However, they are
the only ones for which there seems to be direct authority. It is
sufficient to say that conspiracy depends upon evil intention, and
that on such a charge, a corporation cannot be indicted.'" 5 This initial
Codification of the Criminal Law, General Principles, Inchoate Offences,
Conspiracy,Attempt and Incitement, (London: H.M.S.O., 1973) paras. 35-37. On
husband and wife, see R. v. Whitehouse (1852), 6 Cox C.C. 38; Kowbell v. R.
[1954] S.C.R. 498; Mawji v. R. [1957] A.C. 126, (P.C.);R. v. Chambers (1973),
11 C.C.C. (2d) 282, (Atla. S. C.). Conspiracy before marriage, R. v. Robinson
(1764), 1 Leach 37, 168 E.R. 121. As to the consistency rule, see Harrison, supra,
note 1 at 74-76. More recent treatments of the problem are: R. v. Seguire (1928),
49 C.C.C. 225, (Ont. S.C., App. Div.); Forsythe v. R., [1943] S.C.R. 98; R. v.
Tracey [1946] 4 D.L.R. 296, (B.C.C.A.); KannangaraAratchige Dharmasena v.
R. [1951) A.C. 1, (P.C.); R. v. Amar (1969), 69 W.W.R. 297, (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Funnell (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 215, (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ellis (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d)
220, (Ont. C.A.);D.P.P. v. Shannon The Times, June 20, 1974, page 8, (H.L.).
5. [1912] V.L.R. 162 at 173, (V.S.C.), citing R. v. Great North of England
Railway (1846), 9 Q.B. 315, 115 E.R. 1294; R. v. Stephens (1886), L.R. 1 Q.B.
702; R. v. Holbrook (1877), 3 Q.B.D. 60; 4 Q.B.D. 42. For a similar view as late
as 1941, see R. v. Fane Robinson (1941), 76 C.C.C. 196, (Alta. S. C., App.
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block to the use of the crime of conspiracy against a company, and
indeed, much of the criminal law, was removed by D.P.P. v. Kent

and Sussex Contractors6 and R. v. I.C.R. HaulageLtd. 7 The former
case decided that a company could be convicted, as a company, of
making use of a document signed by its transport officer, which was
false in a material particular with intent to deceive, and making a
statement in furnishing information for that document, which it
knew to be false in a material particular. McNaughten J. held:
It is true that a corporation can only have knowledge and form an
intention through its human agents, but circumstances may be such that
the knowledge and intention of the agent must be imputed to a body
corporate .... if the responsible agent of a company, acting within the
scope of his authority, puts forward on its behalf a document which he
knows to be false and by which he intends to deceive, I apprehend that,
....
his knowledge and intention must be imputed to the company. In
my opinion, the submission . . . . that the respondents could not in law
be capable of a criminal intention cannot be sustained. 8
The Kent and Sussex doctrine was applied almost simultaneously to
the crime of conspiracy in I.C.R. Haulage in which Stable J. held
that a company could be charged with and found guilty of
conspiracy to defraud. 9 Thus there emerged a basic theory that a
company could be held responsible for an offence requiring proof of
mens rea, because the requisite mens rea could be imputed to the
corporate entity from the state of mind of a person, later defined and
restricted, who could be said to be acting for and on behalf of the
company. This has been referred to as the "identification
theory" .10 The basis of this theory is the identification of an
Div.), per Lunney J. A., dissenting. The history of the doctrine is outlined by
Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporationsin English Law (London: London
School of Economics, 1969) Ch. 2-4; The English Law Commission, Working
Paper No. 44, Codification of the Criminal Law, General Principles, Criminal
Liability of Corporations(London: H.M.S.O., 1972) at paras. 10-12; Welsh, "The
Criminal Liability of Corporations" (1946), 62 L.Q.R. 345.
6. [1944]K.B. 146.
7. [1944]K.B. 551.
8. Supra, note 6, at 156.
9. Supra, note 7. at 559. The test used by Stable J. was criticized by Lord Reid in
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) at 173.
10. The phrase "alter ego" used widely to describe the theory, for example, by
Yarosky, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations" (1964), 10 McGill L. J. 142 at
143-4, was disapproved by Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets, id., at 171. Leigh,
The Criminal Liability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5 uses both
"alter ego" and "identification theory". The latter is used by Fisse, "Consumer

Protection and Corporate Responsibility" (1971), 4 Adel. L. R. 113;
"Responsibility, Prevention and Corporate Crime" (1973), 5 N.Z.U.L.R. 250.
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individual with the company, and hence, attribution of his mens rea
to that company. 1
(B) The IdentificationTheory and Vicarious Liability
The identification theory, on which the subjective element of

corporate conspiracy is based, must be distinguished, for present
purposes, from attribution of criminal responsibility to the company
on the basis of vicarious liability. 12 Early confusion between the

two concepts, accurately pointed out by Leigh,

13

was engendered

by the identification theory itself, when the courts remained unsure
which agents, servants, or officials of the company were so
identifiable with it to engage its criminal responsibility. 14 With the
subsequent development, and to a degree, clarification of the
identification theory, the distinction between the theory and
vicarious liability has been marked out by the courts, if not by the
commentators. 15 Thus, Lord Reid said:
11. So phrased by the English Law Commission, supra, note 5, at para. 5. In
Canada, see Yarosky, ibid.; and Waddams, "Alter Ego and the Criminal Liability
of Corporations: Upholsterers International Union of North America, Local 1 v.
Hankin andStruck Furniture,Ltd., etal." (1966), 24 U. T. Fac. L. R. 145.
12. See, for leading discussions on the topic of vicarious liability: Baty, Vicarious
Liability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916); Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The
General Part supra, note 1, at 266-286; Howard, Strict Responsibility (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1963); Sayre, "Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of
Another" (1930), 43 H.L.R. 689.
13. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5,
at 33, commenting on D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex ContractorsLtd., supra, note 6.
Compare the confusing attitude in Mousell Bros. Ltd. v. London and North
Western Railway Co. [1917] 2. K.B. 836, discussed by Leigh at 32-33. The case
appears to have engendered confusion in the mind of Waddams, supra, note 11 at
146. Stable J.,in R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., supra, note 7, at 556, clearly
distinguishes Mousell as a vicarious liability case, as opposed to the one before
him.
14. See Yarosky, supra, note 10, at 147, where he documents the criticism that
followed the case of Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd. [1944] 2 All E.R. 515, (D.C.).
Glanville Williams, supra, note 12, and Welsh, supra, note 5, agree that there is
confusion in that case between vicarious liability and the identification theory, due
to confusion as to what person could engage criminal responsibility under the
identification theory.
15. See Fisse, "The Distinction Between Primary and Vicarious Corporate
Criminal Liability" (1967), 41 A.L.J. 203, and the authority cited at 203. Fisse
submits that the distinction is clear in English law, but that Canadian law is
uncertain. Waddams, supra, note 11, submits that prior to Upholsterers
InternationalUnion ofNorth America Local I v. Hankin and Struck FurnitureLtd.
(1964), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 248, (B.C.C.A.), the dinstinction was clear. Thus, at 151
Waddams states that "the great weight of Canadian and English authority
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Then [under the identification theory] the person who acts is not
speaking or acting for the company. He is the company. There is no
question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a
servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the
company, or one could say, he hears and speaks through the person of
the company, 16within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of
the company.

The English Law Commission reported that: "It is important to
emphasize at the outset the distinction between the liability of the
corporation as a person and its liability as an employee for its
servants and agents, that is, vicarious liability."'17 If one regards the
responsibility of the company as being founded upon vicarious
liability, no problem of mens rea arises. 18 Thus, we are concerned
here, in considering the subjective element of corporate conspiracy,
with cases other than vicarious liability cases. 19
establishes (with occasional lapses) a clear distinction between the doctrine of
corporate liability (identification; alter ego), and that of vicarious liability".
However, the following extract from the judgment of Ford J.A. in R. v. Fane
Robinson Ltd., supra, note 5 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.), which Waddams cites (at
148), scarcely amounts to clear support of this proposition nor of the assertion that
"this case comes well within Viscount Haldane's principle" (at 148): "In this
view, it is not necessary to disagree with the statement that the criminal law knows
no such doctrine as respondeat superior" (emphasis added). See also, in Canada,
the confusing case of R. v. H. J. O'Connell Ltd. [1962] Q.B. 666, (Que. C. A.);
rationalized by Yarosky, supra, note 10, at 154-15 and see R. v. St. Lawrence Co.
Ltd. (1969), 7 C.R.N.S. 265 at 269, (Ont. C. A.), where criminal vicarious
liability is denied. The distinction does seem clear in England, despite some doubts
expressed by Leigh, supra note 5, at 38, and see Wolff, "On the Nature of Legal
Persons" (1938), 54 L.Q.R. 494.
16. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, supra, note 9, at 170. See also Viscount
Dilhorne, id., at 185, and the criticism of Series v. Poole [1969] 1 Q.B. 676 in
Tesco, id., at 173-4, 181, 185-6, 193, 202-3; The English Law Commission,
Working Paper No. 44, Codification of the Criminal Law, General Principles,
Criminal Liability of Corporations, supra, note 5, at para. 4; R. v.
Andrews-Weatherfoil [1972] 1 W.L.R. 118, (C.A.). In Vane v. Yiannopollos
[1965] A.C. 486 at 506, Lord Morris said: "My Lords, the principle respondeat
superiorfinds no place in our criminal law."
17. The English Law Commission, ibid. For a comprehensive survey of the
American position, reference should be made to the Working Papers of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Washington:
U.S.G.P.O., 1970), Volume 1, at 167, heading "Staff Memorandum 1, Existing
Law".
18. Waddams, supra, note 11, at 146.
19. Although, vicarious liability may, in theory, become relevant. See Leigh, The
CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5, at 75:
"Where crimes involving mens rea are in issue, however, the problem arises of
determining what acts are to be ascribed as personal to the corporation and
which are to be actions for which only vicarious liability, albeit liability
involving intent, is to be ascribed."
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(C) Who May Engage CorporateResponsibility?
The Scope of the Theory
The question now to be examined is which corporate officers may
be identified with the company in order to engage its criminal
responsibility. As will be shown, this question is crucial to the
objective element of corporate conspiracy, as well as defining the
limits of the subjective element. The dictum that paved the way for
the identification theory now has its prime significance in the
definition of those who may be identified with the company. In
Lennard's Carrying Company Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.,

Viscount Haldane said that: "....
a corporation is an abstraction, it
has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its
active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person
of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but
who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, its very
ego and the centre of the personality of the corporation ...."o20 Also
of importance is the much quoted test of Denning L. J. in H. L.
Bolton (Engineering)Co. Ltd. v. T. J. Graham & Sons Ltd:
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a

brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands
which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents
who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to
represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who
represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what
it does. The state of mind of these managers
is the state of mind of the
2
company and is treated by the law as such. '

20. [1915] A.C. 705 at 713-4, (H.L.). See also Lord Dunedin, id., at 715:
"..
.he
was the alter ego of the company. He was a director of the company, I
can quite conceive that a company may be entrusting its business to one director be
as truly represented by that one director as in ordinary cases it is represented by the
whole board ..." Compare Viscount Haldane's concept of a company with his
speeches in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398 and Bonanza Creek Gold
Mining Co. v. The King [1916] 1 A.C. 566.
21. [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 at 172, (C.C.A.). See Tesco Super-Markets Ltd. v.
Nattrass,supra, note 9, at 171,per Lord Reid:
"There have been attempts to apply Lord Denning's words to all servants of a
company where work is brain work, or who exercise some managerial
discretion under the direction of superior officers of the company. I do not think
that Lord Denning intended to refer to them."
Id., at 187, per Viscount Dilhorne:
". ...one has in relation to a company to determine who is or who are, for it
may be more than one, in actual control ....
Compare Fisse, supra, note 15, at 207:
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In both Canadian and English law, the issue remains the subject of
many vague general words, and imprecise tests. It is almost possible
to list as many tests as there are cases. In R. v. Canadian Allis
Chalmers Ltd., Orde J., for the Ontario Supreme Court, refused to
draw any line and held merely that a minor servant of the company
does not constitute the "nerve and brain centre.''22 His Lordship
concluded that whether the corporate official in question may be
identified with the company depends upon the circumstances of the
case, the nature of the company's business, and the amount and
nature of authority delegated by the directors. 23 The question for
His Lordship was who was "in authority". With respect, that is but
to restate the problem.
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, Lord Diplock answered
the question by limiting the definition of those who would be
capable of engaging corporate criminal responsibility to those "who
by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result of
action taken by the directors, or by the company in general meeting
pursuant to the articles, are entrusted with the exercise of the powers
of the company.''24 This view cannot be correct. It had been
criticized before Tesco Supermarkets as being too restricted, 2 5 and
inadequate to meet the needs of the implementation of criminal
policy. 25 Fisse commented: "However, such an approach seems to
"However, reliance upon such anthropomorphic conceptions as the 'brain' and
,nerve centre' and upon the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary'
organs implicit in the above statement [by Denning L.J.] can only blunt or
possibly obliterate the distinction between primary and vicarious corporate
liability."
22. (1927), 48 C.C.C. 63 at 81, (Ont. S.C., App. Div.). Other Canadian cases of
interest are: R. v. North Western Hotel Co. Ltd. (1943), 80 C.C.C. 273, (Sask. K.
B.); R. v. Hawinda Taverns Ltd. (1955), 112 C.C.C. 361, (Ont. Co. Ct.); Barreau
De Richilieu v. St. Jean Automobile Ltee [1957] Que. S.C. 310; R. v. J. J.
Beamish Construction Co. Ltd. (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 7, (Ont. S.C.); R. v.
Racey, MacCallum and Associates Ltd. [1967]2 C.C.C. 197, (Ont. Mag. Ct.); Re
Black and Decker Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and The Queen (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d)
470, (Ont. C.A.); (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 193, (S.C.C.).
23. This part of Orde J.'s judgment draws heavily upon that of Stable J. inR. v.I.
C. R. Haulage Ltd., supra, note 6, at 559, disapproved by Lord Reid in Tesco
SupermarketsLtd. v. Nattrasssupra, note 9.
24. Supra, note 9, at 199-200, (H.L.). A similar view was expressed by Powell,
The Law of Agency (London: Pitman, 2nd ed., 1961), at 293 and Welsh, supra,
note 5.
25. Leigh, The CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5,
at 45.
26. Fisse, supra, note 15, at 208.
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rest upon the patently false assumption that a corporation's
constitution reflects the true nature of its managerial functions. Not
only is the assumption false but also it conduces to evasion.' ,27
Lord Reid comes closest to a workable test. He begins with the
company's directors, who are clearly within the test. The hard case
is the one in which the directors have delegated their authority. The
question, says Lord Reid, is whether in these cases, the delegate
may be said to act as a director.28 However, the test remains far
from clear and is patently strained and artificial. Under Lord Reid's
test, one considers who may be identified as the company by
considering who may be identified as a director. The English Law
Commission could state that the class of individuals was generally
clear, but the exact boundaries, the "hard cases", remain
doubtful. 29 Andrews commented: "Who are these people? .... The
artificiality of the whole idea can easily be shown. . . . Companies
have a complexity of directing minds and wills which can conflict,
exceed their duties, behave negligently, forget, act aggressively and
30
so on, perhaps rarely in unison." ,
31
The persons so far found sufficient have included directors,
27. Fisse, "Consumer Protection and Corporate Criminal Responsibility", supra,
note 10, at 121, citing Lamb v. Toldeo-Berket Pty. Ltd. [1969] V.R. 343,
(V.S.C.). Note that the English Law Commission, supra, note 5, at para. 5,
accepts Lord Diplock's test if it means the same as Lord Reid's which follows
infra, note 28. It does not appear to do so. Canadian law has not accepted so
restricted a rule.
28. Supra, note 9, at 171:
Normally the board of directors, the managing director, and perhaps other
superior officers of a company carry out the functions of management and speak
and act as the company. Their subordinates do not. They carry out orders from
above and it can make no difference that they are given some measure of
discretion. But the board of directors may delegate some part of their functions
of management giving to their delegate full discretion to act independently of
instructions from them. I see no difficulty in holding that they have thereby put
such a delegate in their place so that within the scope of the delegation he can
act as the company. It may not always be easy to draw the line ....
See also Viscount Dilhorne, id., at 187.
29. The English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 44, Codification of the
CriminalLaw, GeneralPrinciples, CriminalLiability of Corporations,supra, note
5, at para. 5, and para. 39. Leigh, supra, note 25, Fisse, supra, notes 26 and 27
and Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, supra, note 1, at 269,
273-284, all admit the test is quite uncertain and in hard cases, unusable.
30. Andrews, "Reform in the Law of Corporate Liability" [1973] Crim. L.R. 91
at 93.
31. Lennard's Carrying Company v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd., supra, note 20;
Mousell Bros. Ltd. v. London and North Western Railway Co., supra, note 13
especially at 842, 844; R. v. CanadianAllis-Chalmers Ltd., supra, note 22; R. v.
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managing directors,3 2 branch managers, 3 3 president of an association, 3 4 a weighbridge officer,3 5 a foreman, 3 6 a secretary,3 7 and
a project engineer.3 8 This variety would suggest practical
difficulties. It is proposed to adopt, as a putative definition, that
proposed by Leigh, as a result of his analysis of the jurisprudence.
He suggests that the person should be exercising a "managerial
function" and that the person should "enjoy all relevant powers of
control over that aspect of business to which it relates". 3 9 Further,
"his actions are likely to reflect an underlying corporate policy.' '40
This definition, or series of definitions, while subject to criticism, is
subject to less than most, and serves as a guide to the operation of
the theory.
(D) The Limitation of Scope ofAuthority
An important limitation to the identification theory is the principle
that, if the person "identified" for the purposes of the theory is
acting outside his authority, his mental state cannot be imputed to
the company. 41 This principle was emphasised in Canada in R. v.
Fane Robinson Ltd., supra, note 5; R. v. R. v. 1. C. R. Haulage Ltd., supra, note

7. See generally, Leigh, supra, note 5, at 92-97.
32. Leigh, id., at 45; R. v. 1. C. R. Haulage Ltd. supra, note 7; Barreau De
Richilieu v. St. JeanAutomobile Ltie, supra, note 2. See also D.P.P. v. Kent and
Sussex Contractors Ltd., supra, note 6; Grain Sorghum Marketing Board v.
Supastok Pty. Ltd. [1964] Qd. R. 98, (Q.S.C.), (general managers); The Lady
Gwendolen [1965] 2 All E.R. 283, (C.A.), (assistant managing director).
33. Morre v. 1. Bresler Ltd., supra, note 15; D.P.P. v. Kent dnd Sussex
Contractors Ltd., supra, note 6; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, supra,
note 9.
34. R. v. Electrical ContractorsAssoc. of Ontario and Dent (1961), 27 D.L.R.
(2d) 193, (Ont. C.A.).
35. JohnHenshall (Quarries)Ltd. v. Harvey [1965] 2 Q.B. 233 (D.C.).
36. The Queen v. H. J.O'Connell Ltd., supra, note 15.
37. Moore v. 1. Bresler Ltd., supra, note 15, where the secretary was also a
manager: see also R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd., supra, note 5; Meulen's Hair Stylists
Ltd. v. C.I.R. [1963]N.Z.L.R. 797.
38. R. v. Racey, MacCallum and Associates Ltd., supra, note 22. See also Magna
Plan v. Mitchell [1966] Crim. L. R. 394, (D.C.).
39. Leigh, The CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law supra, note 5,
at 39.
40. id., at 46. For interesting alternative approaches, see Winn, "The Criminal
Responsibility of Corporations" (1929), 3 Camb. L. J.398; Downey, "Aiding and
Abetting A Statutory Offence" (1959), 22 Mod. L. R. 91. "It should also be noted
that prior to the O'Connell decision in 1962, in every case in which a corporation
was convicted of a criminal offence requiring mens rea, the guilty acts were
committed by directors of the corporation." Yarosky, supra, note 10, at 155.
41. In the United States, the "scope of authority" limitation is not so clear. In
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Ash Temple, a conspiracy case, in which Robertson C. J. 0. held
that: "It is well settled that conspiracy is one of the crimes that a
company can commit and that the necessary mens rea may be found
in an officer, servant, or agent authorized by the company to act for
it .

. .

. if the act relied on is that of an officer, servant or agent of

the company, there must be evidence that he had authority from the
company to do the act."42 To the extent that His Lordship implies
that authorization alone renders the company criminally responsible, he is wrong. The law requires that the servant, agent or officer
be also of sufficiently high rank to be identified with the company.
(E) Conclusion
It may be seen that, through the general criminal law, the crime of
conspiracy has overcome the subjective element of conspiratorial
mens rea, although it can hardly be said that the law is either clear
or satisfactory. The problems that arise, as to the subjective
element, in the application of the crime of conspiracy to the
company are those of the general criminal law, and will be resolved
if and when those general problems are resolved.
(3) The Objective Element (1): The "One Man Company"
Having formulated a general concept as to who may be identified
with the company for the purposes of proof of mens rea in criminal
cases generally, a corresponding understanding may be gained of
Note, "Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy", supra, note 1, at 951-2,
it is implied that an agent must act within the scope of his authority. However, see
Working Papersof the NationalCommission on Reform of FederalCriminalLaws,

supra, note 17, at 171-2, which implies the contrary. The English portion is
summarized by the English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 44, Codification
of the Criminal Law, General Principles, Criminal Liability of Corporations,

supra, note 5, para. 9, citing Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd., supra, note 15. See also
Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5, at

46-51; Fisse, "Responsibility, Prevention and Corporate Crime" supra, note 10, at
256, (ratification); D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex ContractorsLtd., supra, note 6, at
156; R. v. Stanley Haulage Ltd. (1964), 114 L.J. 25; John Henshall (Quarries)
Ltd. v. Harvey, supra, note 35; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, supra, note

9, at 171, per Lord Reid, and 200, per Lord Diplock. On the question of acts
detrimental to the company, see R. v. Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. [1954] O.R.

543, (Ont. H.C.), and StandardOil Co. of Texas v. United States (1963), 307 F.
2d 120, (Fifth Circuit).
42. (1949), 93 C.C.C. 267 at 279-80, (Ont. C.A.). My emphasis. See alsoR. v.
Canadian Allis-Chalmers Ltd., supra, note 22; R. v. St. Lawrence Corp. supra,

note 15, at 273, (Ont. C.A.).
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who may agree for the company, and how. With respect to the
objective element, it is clear that no problem arises where one
company is charged with conspiring with another company, for here
there are two persons, however artificial. Similarly, conspiracy
between a company and another person unconnected with the
company is unobjectionable, so long as mens rea may be attributed
to the company in the normal way.
However, where it is alleged that a company has conspired with
the one man who owns and directs its operations, acute problems of
plurality arise. In general, where conspiracy is charged between a
company and its director, a crisis of identity arises, if by "director"
one refers to him who may engage corporate criminal responsibility.
In the discussion which follows, "director" will bear that meaning
and "employee" will refer to the lower echelon servants of the
company.
Where it is alleged that a director has conspired with his
company, the requisite corporate mens rea can only be attributed to
the company through the director. However, if that is done,
conceptually the director and the company are the same, and there
are not two minds in agreement, but one alone. To hold otherwise
would be to find conspiracy in every case where a director has
committed a crime. Where the company is owned and solely
controlled by the director, the "crisis of identity" is even more
obvious. Thus: "Where the corporation is controlled by a single
individual the distinct social reality of the corporate personality may
be non-existent. The corporate entity instead tends to directly reflect
the personality of the individual. In such cases the extent to which
the two personalities are separated depends wholly upon a legal
device. ' 43 Having pierced the corporate veil for one purpose, it is
difficult to justify refusing to do so for another.
In R. v. McDonnell, 44 the accused was a director and sole owner
of two companies. He was charged with conspiring with each
company to commit various fraudulent activities. Nield J. held that
the indictment could not stand:
....where the sole responsible person in the company is the defendant
himself, it would not be right to say that there were two persons or two
minds. If it were otherwise, I feel that it would offend against the basic
concept of a conspiracy, namely, an agreement of two or more to do an
43. Woods, "Lifting the Corporate Veil in Canada" (1957), 35 C.B.R. 1176 at
1177.
44. [1966] 1 Q.B. 233, (Bristol Assizes).
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unlawful act, and I think it would be artificial to take the view that the
company, although it is clearly a separate legal entity, can be regarded
here as a separate person or a separate mind, in view of the admitted fact
45
that this defendant acts alone so far as these companies are concerned.
His Lordship went on to extend this principle to any case where a
company is charged with conspiring with one of its directors. 46
Thus, this case may be regarded as an aggravated example of a
general principle, since it is not possible to speak of the mens rea of
the company without speaking of the mens rea of the particular
director. 4 7 Since the identification theory deems the embodiment of
the company in the mind of the director, the company and the
director are the same person for this purpose .48 It follows that

conspiracy may not be charged.
Leigh, commenting on McDonnell, has suggested that the
essence of the problem is not the lack of two persons but the lack of
two minds. 49 While having a certain superficial attractiveness, the
distinction is unsound and unnecessary. First, it confuses the
45. Id., at 245.
46. Id., at 246:
". ... the true position is that a company and a director cannot be convicted of
conspiracy when the only human being who is said to have broken the law or
intended to do so is the one director, and that is the situation in the present
case."
47. Thus, for example, Lord Reid said:
"He is an embodiment of the company, or, one could say, he hears and speaks
and his mind is the mind of the
through the persona of the company ....
company."
Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass, supra, note 9, at 170.
48. Ibid. See also the discussion of the English Law Commission, Working Paper
No. 50, Codificationof the CriminalLaw, General Principles,Inchoate Offences,
Conspiracy,Attempt and Incitement, supra, note 4, para. 34, where McDonnell is
said to be right as to both wide and narrow ratios. Leigh also agrees; supra, note 5,
at 53-4. There are other cases in English law which pierce the corporate veil in a
similar way, but in quite different contexts. Examples are: F. A. Clark & Son v.
I.R.C. [19411 2 K.B. 270; British American Tobacco Ltd. v. I.R.C. [1943] A.C.
335;I.R.C. v.J. Bibby & Sons Ltd. [1945] 1 All E.R. 667, (H.L.); Firestone Tyre
& Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Lewellin [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464, (H.L.); S. Berendson Ltd. v.
I.R.C. [1958] Ch. 1, (C.A.); Unit Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bullock [1960]
A.C. 351.
49. Leigh, supra note 5, at 54: "Thus clearly, there were two persons involved. It
could not, however, be said that there were two minds involved. "Leigh, id., at 54,
also says that Nield J. concluded: ......
that while the company is an entity
separate from its alter ego its liability is predicated on an identification of the
actions of its alter ego with it." Footnote 103 alleges that the distinction was
explicitly drawn by Nield J., but no specific reference is given. It is submitted that
not only is the distinction incorrect, but Nield J. never made it. The words "alter
ego" do not appear in the judgment.
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objective and subjective elements of conspiracy. The identification
theory, by making a party of the company for the purposes of the
subjective question, has simply confused the objective question in
this particular crime as a consequence. Second, the root of the
plurality problem, as with conspiracy between husband and wife,
lies in the application of a two party crime to an essentially one
party situation. 50 In particular, the company is an artificial person
created for the economic realities of the twentieth century, and a
medieval crime must have difficulty in adaptation.
In Canada, R. v. Martin51 demonstrates similar reasoning to
McDonnell. In that case, a conspiracy was alleged between M, his
codirector A, an auditor H, and the company. The company was
owned and controlled by M. The court found that A and H had not
conspired and held that:
....
[M] was the sole actor in the management and control of the
company. When Allison and Hare are eliminated, the charges
disappear, for the
company could have no mens rea apart from that of
Martin himself. 52
In R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., 53 the company was charged with
conspiring with R, R's wife, two employees and other persons. R
owned all but one share in the company, which was owned by his
wife. It is submitted that the Martin-McDonnell reasoning applies
equally to this case. A conspiracy charge against A, B and C, for
example, alleges that A conspired with B, and C, that B conspired
with A and C, and that C conspired with B and A. Where A is a
company and B is its owner-director, it is clear that A may conspire
with C, but not B, that B may conspire with C and not A, and that C
may conspire with B. Thus, the indictment in I.C.R. Haulage
should have been held defective insofar as the owner-director, R,
was charged with conspiring with the company. This defect could
50. Nield J. in fact said: "....
it would not be right to say that there were two
persons or two minds." [1966] 1 Q.B. 233 at 245; (my emphasis). Similarly, in
Union Pacific Coal Co. v. U.S. (1909), 173 F. 737 at 745, (U.S.C.A., Eighth
Circuit), the court said: "The union of two or more persons, the conscious
participation of two or more minds .... ". The basis of the husband-wife rule is
lack of two persons: Card, "The Working Paper on Inchoate Offences: (2) Reform
of the Law of Conspiracy" [1973] Crim. L. R. 674 at 679. The acquittal rule is
based on the lack of two minds: Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General
Part,supra, note 1, at 669-671.
51. [1933] 1 D.L.R. 434, (Man. C.A.).
52. Id., at 440-1 ,per Dennistoun J. A. See also Woods, supra, note 43, at 1186.
53. Supra, note 7. The facts are omitted from the Kings Bench Report, but see
[194411 All E.R. 691 at 692.
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have been remedied by specific and separate counts. However,
Stable J. did not direct his mind to the issue.
The American jurisprudence reveals a similar approach, although
it is important to note that almost any employee may be a
"director"
for the purposes of the attribution of criminal
responsibility, and thus questions of plurality are correspondingly
far reaching.54 In Goldlawr Inc. v. Schubert,55 it was held that
there can be no conspiracy between a company and its sole
shareholder. 56 A similar result was reached in Union Pacific Coal
Co. v. United States57 in which a conspiracy was charged between a
company and one of its senior officials. 58 An interesting authority to
the contrary is Wood v. UnitedStates, 59 in which a director objected
that to convict the company and himself would be to expose him to
double jeopardy: he would be penalized as a shareholder as well as
an individual. The court rejected this contention:
If a man for his own convenience chooses to conduct any business
through a corporation, he is estopped to say that he and the corporation
are one person and not two. He may not obtain for himself the limitation
of liability and the other advantages which flow from the conduct of the
business by the corporation and then when it suits him say that there is
no difference between him and the corporation. For the purposes of this
whether Wood owned one share of the corporate
case, it is immaterial
60
stock or all of it.

In Standard Oil v. State, it was held that a company could conspire
with its directors, 1 but writing after that decision, Hall summarized
54. See infra, note 92.
55. (1960),276 F. 2d 614at 617, (U.S.C.A., Third Circuit).
56. Applying Nelson Radio and Supply Co. Inc. v. Motorola Inc. (1952), 200 F.

2d 911, (U.S.C.A., Fifth Circuit). For a detailed discussion of the American
position, see Stengel, "Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under Section 1of the Sherman
Act" (1963-4), 35 Miss. L.J. 5, and below, note 92 ff.
57 Supra, note 56. See also Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. NationalSalesmen's Assoc.
(1927), 19 F. 2d. 963, (U.S.C.A., Seventh Circuit).
58. Id., at 745:
". . .. [If this indictment were upheld] the distinction between the commission
of an offence and a combination to commit it by a corporation vanishes into thin
air; for a corporation can act only by an agent, and every time an agent commits
an offence within the scope of his authority under this theory the corporation
necessarily combines with him to commit it. This cannot be, and it is not, the
law. The union of two or more persons, the conscious participation in the
scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful combination, and
it cannot be created by the action of one man alone."
59. (1913), 204 F. 55, (U.S.C.A., Fourth Circuit).
60. Id., at 56.
61. (1907), 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705 at 717. The decision was of general

application:
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the American law: ". . . . there can be no conviction for conspiracy
where a plurality of parties is logically necessary for the crime,
since the corporation could not be held for any affirmative crime
unless one of its agents acted on its behalf." 6 2 It is therefore
submitted that there can be no conspiracy between a company and
its owner-director. From this it follows that a director cannot
conspire with his company, for the same rationale applies to both
cases. Conspiracy may be validly charged between three persons,
except insofar as it is implied that a company may conspire with one
of its directors.
(4) The Objective Element (2): A Company and its Directors
(A) Conspiracy Between a Company, One Director, and an
Employee
As indicated above, it is submitted that an indictment alleging
conspiracy between a company, a director, and another person or
persons, raises a question of parties. The essence of such cases as
I.C.R. Haulage63 is that it alleges the three conspired together and
thus that the director conspired with the company.
The point has not been taken, and what authority there is, tends to
the contrary. For example in Egan v. Barrier Branch of the
Amalgamated Miners Association it was decided that a trade union
and its members can be party to a civil conspiracy, whether the
members be officers of the union or not. 64 This was accepted by the
Australian High Court in Williams v. Hursey.65 Glanville Williams
states: "However, if a director on behalf of his company conspires
with another, the director, company and third person may together
"We are of the opinion that, independent of statute upon principle and in
furtherance of social public policy, both corporations and their officers and
agents who engage in the conspiracy must be held to be parties to it, and be
counted in computing the necessary number to constitute it.'" I ., at 718.
62. Hall, "The Substantive Law of Crimes, 1887-1936" (1937), 50 H.L.R. 616 at
648, accepted as stating the American position by Glanville Williams, supra, note
1, at 861; Note, "Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy", supra, note 1,
at 952 n. 216.
63. Supra, note 7. This point was impliedly raised by the English Law
Commission, Working Paper 50, Codification of the Criminal Law, General
Principles,Inchoate Offences, Conspiracy, Attempt and Incitement, supra, note 4,
para. 34 n. 42.
64. (1917), 17 S.R. (N.S.W.) 243 esp. at 257-8, relying upon Brisbane
Shipwrights' Provident Union v. Heggie (1905), 3 C.L.R. 686, (H. C. Aust.).
65. (1959), 103 C.L.R. 30 at 129, (H. C. Aust.)per Menzies J.
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be convicted of conspiracy",66 For this proposition, American
authority of doubtful application, and R. v. Martin are cited. 6 7 Both
are very doubtful support.
(B) ConspiracyBetween a Company and Two of its Directors
What of the case where it is alleged that the company has conspired
with two or more of its directors? In such a case, Glanville Williams
points out, there are two minds and so, he submits, an indictable
conspiracy. 68 However, Leigh inclines to the contrary view, 69 and
Waddams points out that "[s]uch a situation could raise difficult
conceptual problems ....,,70 The question is whether there may
be two or more directors for the purposes of the identification
theory, and if so, what problems follow from that finding.
It seems that both as a matter of law and as a matter of common
sense, one company may have more than one person capable of
71
engaging corporate criminal responsibility in any given case.
Thus, in Tesco Supermarkets, Viscount Dilhorne said that: .....
one has in relation to a company to determine who is or who are, for
it may be more than one, in actual control of the operations of the

company.

. . .

'17 2 InR. v. St. Lawrence Corp. Ltd., Schroeder J.A.

held: "It follows from the cases which I have discussed that a
company can have more than one directing mind or alter ego.' '7
Thus, in R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd., the Supreme Court of Alberta
held that two persons constituted the acting and directing will of the

company. 74
66. Glanville Williams, Criminal law: The General Part, supra, note 1, at para.
281.
67. R. v. Martin, supra, note 51. The doubtful relevance of U.S. authority is
discussed, infra, note 92 ff.
68. Glanville Williams, supra, note 1, at para. 281.
69. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5,
at 55.
70. Waddams, supra, note 11, at 147-8.
71. As well as the law cited below, see Waddams, id., at 147-8:
"It would seem as a general rule that there can only be one alter ego of a
company at any particular time. But in some cases ..... it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that there many be more than one. . . .But such a situation must be
rare . . . . "

Waddams raises the problem where one possible director acts in opposition to
another. The problem does not affect conspiracy, which presupposes agreement.
72. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, supra, note 9, at 187, (H.L.).
73. Supra, note 15, at 273, (Ont. C. A.).
74. Supra, note 5, at 203, (Alta. S. C., App. Div.). "In my opinion George
Robinson and Emile Fielhaber were the acting and directing will of Fane Robinson
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The courts have not really determined how the concept operates.
It is implied in Fane Robinson that the company with two directors
has one composite mens rea. But in such a case, the company has,
in common sense, no mind at all. For example, if three directors are
charged with conspiring with the company, and one is acquitted,
must the company also be acquitted if the company's mens rea is to
be that of all three?
Conversely, if either director is the company, then one can only
reach the conclusion that director A can conspire with the company
because director B's intent is imputed to it, and director B can
conspire with the company because director A's intent is imputed to
it. This is all very complex and far removed from reality. Again, the
structure breaks down where one director is acquitted.
The logical and conceptual problems which arise from problems
such as these indicate that the crime of conspiracy is simply
inappropriate to deal with corporate crime - particularly large scale
corporate crime. 75 If possible, it would surely be simple in any case
to charge the substantive crime which is the object of the
conspiracy, against the party or parties where the sanction should
strike. In any case, if the sanction should be directed against the
shareholders, prosecute the company. 76 If it is appropriate,
prosecute the directors. The use of the wide net of conspiracy
reveals a failure to consider the appropriate object of the criminal
sanction. It is freely conceded that difficult logical or conceptual
technicalities should not impede the necessary implementation of
criminal policy and social standards: the question is rather whether
conspiracy is the best vehicle for enforcement. In the application of
a criminal offence, such as conspiracy, to a situation for which it
was not designed, conceptual difficulties inevitably arise in
squaring the crime with its new purpose.
One further problem must be mentioned. Where one director
knows fact A, and another director fact B, and knowledge of facts A
and B are necessary to constitute a given crime, then, as a result of
dual imputation, the company may arguably be criminally
responsible. The English Law Commission rejected such an
argument, arguing that at least one director have the whole mens
Ltd. generally and in particular .. " Accord, Minnisohn v. U.S. (1939), 101 F.
2d. 477, (U.S.C.A., Third Circuit).
75. See Andrews, supra, note 30, at 93.
76. See Woods, supra, note 43, at 1181.
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rea.7 7 In cases of conspiracy, however, we may require more than
one director to have the whole mens rea, as where two directors are
charged with conspiring with the company.
(C) The Director who Acts in More Than One Capacity
78
In R. v. Electrical ContractorsAssociation of Ontario and Dent,
the company was an incorporated association of which D was the
president and director. The association was organized into groups of
members, one of which was Zone 20. D was an officer and director
of Zone 20. The association, Zone 20 and D were charged with
conspiracy to unduly lessen competition, together with another
company, Roxborough Electric, which was owned and controlled
by D. Other persons were charged as coconspirators, but these
persons may be ignored in studying the reasoning of the court,
which found all accused guilty:
....
it is not necessarily a defence to an indictment against a
corporation under that section that only one human being intended to
break the law. That person might act in more than one legal capacity.
For instance, he might be a director of more than one corporation or he
might have personal interests of the same kind as that of a corporation of
which he is a director. Thus, he may be regarded as though he were two
separate persons and two separate minds. In the instant case, the

intention of Dent as president and director of the appellant corporation
may be imputed to the appellant so as to be the intention and will of the
association, while, at the same time, the intention and will of Dent as a
person in control of Roxborough Electric Ltd. may be imputed to that
corporation so as to be its intention and will . . .79
It followed that Dent and his company and his association could
conspire together.8 0 It is submitted that this reasoning is wrong and
should not be followed. There are three major criticisms that may be
directed against it.
Firstly, the argument proves too much insofar as it would
dissolve into thin air the whole question of intracorporate plurality.
For example, the court cited I.C.R. Haulage8 l as authority for dual
77. The English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 44, Codification of the
CriminalLaw, General Principles,The CriminalLiability of Corporations,supra,
note 5, at para. 39(d). A similar view is expressed by Leigh, supra, note 5, at 57.
But see Inland Freight Lines v. U.S. (1951), 191 F. 2d. 313, (U.S.C.A., Tenth
Circuit).
78. Supra, note 34.
79. Id., at 200.
80. Ibid.
81. Supra, note 7. Also citing Glanville Williams on CriminalLaw (1953) at 683:
presumably the first edition of CriminalLaw: The GeneralPart,supra, note 1.
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legal capacity, since in that case, the director, the company, and a
third person were held guilty of conspiracy. 8 2 It follows that the
court recognized that I.C.R. Haulage involved a problem of parties,
although Stable J. did not advert to it, and that the dual legal
capacity argument solved the problem. Such an assumption is
entirely unwarranted. It was submitted above first, that Stable J. did
not see the problem, and second, that if he had, the indictment could
not stand. This approach is shared by the English Law
Commission,"3 and I.C.R. Haulage is not, and should not be, law
on this point. The dual legal capacity argument would solve the
problem of the "one man company." However, the case and the
argument were explicitly rejected by Nield J. in McDonnell on the
ground that it would offend against basic conspiracy requirements. 8 4 McDonnell attacks the very basis of Electrical
Contractors.
Secondly, Electrical Contractors piles fiction upon fiction,
although, no doubt, for utilitarian purposes. By a fiction, the
director is considered to have two minds, one as a person, the other
as a company. By a further fiction, his mind as a company is
deemed to be that of the company, which being an artificial person,
can only be considered to have mens rea by a fiction. Such legal
sophistry has little to commend it. That it is needed to attack
corporate wrongdoing and further the application of criminal or
social policy points to a need for a reassessment of the role that the
crime of conspiracy plays in the implementation of legislature
policy. Are these fictions necessary at all?
Thirdly, it is argued that the result of the dual legal capacity
argument is an overreach of the criminal sanction. In Electrical
Contractors, the sanction should have been directed to the real
culprit: Dent. Once it is said that an accused director may act in
82. Supra, note 34, at 200: "Finally, it may be stated on the authority of R. v.
I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., supra that if a director on behalf of his company conspires
with another, the director, the company, and third person may together be
convicted of conspiracy." It is submitted that Stable J. did not decide the question.
See also supra, note 63.
83. The English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 50, Codification of the
Criminal Law, General Principles, Inchoate Offences, Conspiracy, Attempt, and
Incitement, supra, note 4, at para. 34 n. 42.
84. Supra, note 44, at 245. McDonald, "Criminality and the Canadian
Anti-Combines Laws" (1965), 4 Alb. L. R. 67 at 78, restricts Electrical
Contractorsto cases where the officer acts in more than one capacity, but regards
prosecution on this basis as unlikely. See also Stengel, supra, note 56 and U.S. v.
Wise (1962), 370 U.S. 405.
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more than one legal capacity, it follows, as a pure matter of logic,
that the crime of conspiracy may reach any company employing the
accused, so long as he acts within the scope of his authority, since
there will always be imputation and thus always agreement. 8 5 In the
world of reality, however, it may be inappropriate to sanction a
company for whom the director acts, since the result of dual legal
capacity would be akin to strict vicarious responsibility.
Further, the authority cited by the court is unconvincing. Apart
from I.C.R. Haulage, the court citedR. v. Martin,86 but if that case
had accepted dual legal capacity, it would have been decided
differently. The court also relied on dicta from O'Brien v.
Dawson, 87 but that was a civil action for inducement of breach of
contract and not a criminal prosecution for conspiracy. Further,
although Starke J. did distinguish between the legal capacities of a
company director, he did so to absolve the company from liability.
In reality, one person had broken the law in Electrical
Contractors, but his activities were cloaked behind a corporate
veil. 88 Having lifted the corporate veil, the correct approach would
be to apply the criminal sanction to the individual, rather than to
recognize a corporate veil by separating man from company and
thus confuse the issue. It is no answer to suggest that anti-combine
legislation is or may be framed only in terms of conspiracy and no
alternative count was possible in this case. Many of the activities
constituting corporate crime may be attacked through statutory

85. See Union PacificCoal Co. v. U.S. supra, note 50, at 745, (U.S.C.A., Eighth
Circuit):
"....the distinction between the commission of an offense and a combination
to commit it by a corporation vanishes .... every time an agent commits an
offense within the scope of his authority under this theory, the corporation
necessarily conspires with him to commit it."
86. Supra, note 51, at 441, (Man. C. A.). Quoted (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 193 at
201.
87. (1942), 66 C.L.R. 18 at 32, (H. C. Aust.),per Starke J., quoted id., at 201:
"The company, if it were guilty of a breach of its contracts in this case, acted
through its director the respondent Doyle, but it is neither "law nor sense" to
say that Doyle in the exercise of his functions as a director of the company
combined with it to do any unlawful acts or become a joint tortfeasor ..... The
acts of Doyle were the acts of the company and not his personal acts which
involved him in any liability to the plaintiff. But I would add that it does not
follow that a director of a company would escape personal liability under cover
of the company's responsibility if he himself became an actor."
88. In U.S. law, Electrical Contractorswould have been decided differently. See
U.S. v. SantaRita Store Co. (1911), 113 P. 620, (New Mex.).
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provisions which apply directly to the corporation and its officers. 8 9
If the company cannot be properly held guilty of conspiracy, it is
not up to the courts by fiction to fill gaps or remedy bad or
inadequate legislation. 90 On the contrary, penal statutes should be
strictly construed. 91
(D) The American Approach
It is important to stress again that American law does not appear to
adopt the Anglo-Canadian distinction between employees and
directors. 92 There is considerable authority for the view that the
mens rea of any corporate official acting within the scope of his
employment may be imputed to the company. 93
89. Most Criminal Code offences, for example, are directed toward individuals or
companies, or both, explicitly. See The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
s.2(1), where the definition of "everyone" includes bodies corporate. The English
solution is a provision which reads:
"Where an offence .... committed by a body corporate is proved to have been
committed with the consent or connivance of, any director, manager, secretary,
or other similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting
to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of
that offence, and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly."
See, for example, Building Control Act U.K., 1966, c.27, section 9(5); Industrial
Development Act, U.K., 1966, c.34, section 10: Sea Fisheries Rgulations Act,
U.K., 1966 c.38, section 11(6). The need for Electrical Contractor's fictions is
obviated.
90. An examination of United States antitrust law showed that it was always
possible to convict accused without resorting to the conspiracy offence. See
Comment, "Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act" (1953-54), 63
Yale L. J. 372 at 388.
91. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, supra, note 1, at 217;
R. v. Singer (1931), 56 C.C.C. 68 at 71, (Ont. H. C.);R. v. ContainerMaterials
Ltd. (1940), 74 C.C.C. 113 at 127, (Ont. S. C.), R. v. Imperial Tobacco Co.
(1942), 77 C.C.C. 146 at 150-1, (Alta. C. A.); Winnipeg Film Society v. The
Queen (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 126, (S.C.C.); R. v. McDonnell, supra, note 44, at
240.
92. See the authority cited by Fisse, supra, note 15, at 203 n. 5. This results in a
confusion between the identification theory and vicarious liability. See Leigh, The
CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5, at 36 and 38, and
Mueller, "Mens Rea and the Corporation" (1957-8), 19 U. Pitt. L. R. 21 at 41-2.
The confusion is unhappily demonstrated in Note, "Criminal Liability of
Corporations For Acts of Their Agents" (1946), 60 H.L.R. 283, where the author
cites English identification theory cases as examples of vicarious liability.
93. Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of FederalCriminal
Laws, supra, note 17, Volume 1 at 170, and the authority cited therein, and the
English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 44, Codification of The Criminal
Law, General Principles, Criminal Liability of Corporations, supra, note 5, at
para. 11. For strong criticism of this law, see Mueller, supra, note 92.
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Two early cases may be cited for the view that a company may
conspire with its agents: Patterson v. United States, 94 and White
Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp.9 5 The philosophy
behind these cases and the point of view which they represent was
the legal fiction by which the
stated by Kramer as follows: "....
acts of officers are merged into the corporation may not be used to
defeat the public policy of the laws prohibiting conspiracies to
commit crimes.- 96
The bulk of authority is against the approach espoused by
Kramer. The leading decision is Nelson Radio and Supply Co. Inc.
v. Motorola Inc., 97 in which an antitrust conspiracy was alleged
between a company, its president, its sales manager, and employees
who "have been actively engaged in the management, direction,
and control of affairs and business" of the company. 98 The court
proceeded upon common-law principles9 9 and held: ".... .it
appears plain to us that the conspiracy upon which the plaintiff
relies consists simply in the absurd assertion that the defendant,
through its officers and agents, conspired with itself to restrain its
trade in its own products." 1 0 0 Nelson has since been applied a
number of times, including in the case of Poller v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem Inc. in which it was held that: "Poller's charge
... .is in reality a charge that C.B.S. conspired with itself ....
94. (1915), 222 F. 599, (Sixth Circuit). See Bamdt, "Two Trees or One? - The
Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy" (1961-1962), 23 Mont. L. R. 158 at 162.
95. (1942), 129 F. 2d 600, (Eighth Circuit). See also Arthur v. Kraft-Phoenix
Cheese Corp. (1938), 26 F. Supp. 824. (D. C. Md.), and Times-Picayune
PublishingCo. v. U.S. (1953), 345 U.S. 594.

96. Kramer, "Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its
Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce
Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act?" (1950), 11 Fed. B. J.130 at 131-2. See
also Lee, "Corporate Criminal Liability" (1928), 28 Col. L. R. 1 at 9; Hall, "The
Substantive Law of Crimes 1887-1936" (1937), 50 H. L.R. 616 at 648. Other
cases which agree with Kramer's point of view are: Standard Oil v. State supra,
note 61; Minnisohn v. U.S., supra, note 74; Egan v. U.S. (1943), 137 F. 2d 369,
(U.S.C.A., Eighth Circuit).

97. Supra, note 56.
98. Id., at 914.
99. See Note, "Developments in The Law: Criminal Conspiracy", supra, note 1,
at 1003 n. 631.
100. Supra, note 56 at 914. The dissentient argued:
"It seems to me that whether the functions are performed by separate
corporations or by a single entity is purely a matter of convenience to be
exercised under state law and that the incidence and effect of the federal
antitrust laws should be the same no matter what form the transactions take."
Id., at 916.
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We conclude that C.B.S., its unincorporated division, and its
employees were incapable of conspiring to restrain trade and

commerce. " 101
These cases, and others like them, may be approached in two
ways. Firstly, they can be approached as cases which refuse to find
necessary plurality in cases where companies are charged with
conspiring with their agents because of the imputation of mens rea
to the company. Poller's case, for example, was decided on this
ground. Secondly, however, Nelson may be explained as holding
that the executive directors, as a group, cannot conspire with the
company. After all, the members of the executive, collectively,
charged in Nelson were the whole company and, in a very real
sense, it could be said that the charge amounted to conspiring with
oneself.
This narrow interpretation of Nelson has not been recognized as
an option, but, where conspiracy is alleged between the body of
men who control the company and the company itself, an analogy to
the McDonnell one man company becomes apparent. However,
whether one adopts one view or the other, weakness in the use of
conspiracy against a company is revealed. On the wide view, there
can be no conspiracy due to imputation, but the matter may be
remedied by omitting the company from the indictment and
charging the individual directors with conspiring with each other.
While the narrow view has a different rationale, the same result and
remedy follow. Thus, it is plain that there are severe conceptual
difficulties in charging a company with conspiracy.
(5) The Objective Element (3): Vertical Integrationand "Single
CorporateForm"
(A) Dominion Steel and Coal, And Some GeneralIssues
In this section, it is intended to deal with the case where it is alleged
that a company has conspired with a subsidiary company, partly or
wholly owned by it. 1 02 The problem rests in the fact of control. Can
it be truly said that where the same group of directors control two
101. (1960), 284 F. 2d 599, at 603, (U.S.C.A., D.C. Circuit).
102. The word "subsidiary" and its definition will be central to this section, and
will be used, until defined in the text, to mean any company with significant ties to
another in a subordinate sense, until that time. See Woods, supra, note 43, at 1181,
and Barndt, supra, note 94, at 188.
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companies, that these companies can conspire with each other? In
McDonnell, 103 the individual defendant owned and controlled two
companies, but was charged with conspiring with each. Could the
Crown have prosecuted both of his companies for conspiring with
each other?
In 1969, Leigh was unable to find a decided English case on the
subject, 10 4 and only one Canadian case, R. v. Dominion Steel and
Coal Corporation.10 5 In that case, conspiracy was alleged between
several companies, one of which was a wholly owned subsidiary of
another conspirator. Judson J.held:
Perhaps I should say a word about the position of Canadian Steel.
Canadian Steel came into the agreement when it became a subsidiary of
Dosco. It was submitted that I could not make any finding of guilt
against this company because it had no independent volition of its own,
that it acted under the express direction of Dosco in Montreal.
This is a limited company. It is true that it is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Dosco, but it had its own officials; it had its own representatives at
the meetings I have mentioned; it played an important part in the
industry.
I can see no basis for excusing a subsidiary because it acts under the
control of its parent company. It was not part of the agreement at its
inception. It came into the agreement0 6when it got into the industry and
took an active part in the agreement.'
This judgment is ambiguous. The thrust of the second paragraph
appears to be that His Lordship will find Canadian Steel guilty,
despite its wholly owned status, because it had its own officials,
representatives, and played an important, and presumably separate,
role in the industry. However, the concluding paragraph goes back
on much of this. First, it begs the question by stating that "itcame"
and "it took". Secondly, having established in the preceeding
paragraph factors which may make the subsidiary a separate legal
person from its parent, the concluding paragraph admits that the
subsidiary was under the control of the parent company. Further,

103. Supra, note 44.
104. Leigh, The CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5,
at 56.
105. (1956), 116 C.C.C. 117, (Ont. H. C.).
106. Id., at 134-5. Leigh, supra, note 104, says of the case:
"Provided that each has a separate organization and its own management, there
would appear to be no difficulty in holding that such corporations could
conspire together, and that for the most part is the clear result in the United
States and Canada."
It is submitted that the result, even the problem, is far from clear."
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the sweeping terms of the concluding paragraph, taken in isolation,
would lead to the conclusion that, in any case, a company can
conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary. It is submitted that the
general statements in the final paragraph must be limited by what
preceded them.
Judson J. states that a factor in deciding the "separateness" of
the subsidiary for the purposes of the parties requirement of
conspiracy is the fact that the subsidiary has separate officials. This
must, however, depend on the facts of the case. A subsidiary
company must have office bearers and directors or it is not a
subsidiary company. It is submitted that the real tests must be who
pays the office bearers and where their orders ultimately come
from.' 0 7 Otherwise, "separateness" would depend entirely upon
the effect of the corporate veil. It is begging the question to argue
that the subsidiary is separately incorporated and it therefore a
separate "person". If the courts fail to look behind the corporate
veil to the reality of control, then mere conveniences of
bookkeeping or office management, open to manipulation, may be
determinative of "separateness". Once the court has pierced the
corporate veil to see who owns the shares of the subsidiary, it
should not be content to accept appearances at face value. '0 8
The fact that Canadian Steel "played an important part in the
industry" is also question begging. The question is whether it was
the subsidiary which did so or the parent company using the
subsidiary as a convenient tool. However, appearances may be
important for another reason. Some American courts have indicated
that, in antitrust cases at least, the question whether the subsidiary
and the parent have created the appearance of competition may
sway the court into holding that they are in fact separate.' 0 9 This
may rest not so much upon the concept of poetic justice, as,
perhaps, that the parent is estopped thereby from pleading "single

107. This really comes back to "control". See Leigh, ibid. and the discussion
which follows.
108. See, for a general discussion on the attitude and history of Anglo Canadian
law with respect to this question: Woods, supra, note 43.
109. See, for example, Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons (1951), 340 U.S.
211 at 215, and the rejection of this by Stengel, supra, note 56, at 22, and by
McQuade, "Conspiracy, Multi-Corporate Enterprises and Section 1 of The
Sherman Act" (1955), 41 Va. L. R. 183 at 213: "Besides being the wrong way to
enforce a policy of separating the separable, this doctrine is certainly a difficult
way."
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corporate form", 11° or because the steps taken to achieve the
appearance of separateness, achieve the reality as well. 1 '
The factor of separate representation at the conspiratorial
agreement, mentioned by Judson J., may be important, but it should
not obscure reality. It should be noted that this too is open to
manipulation and is not necessarily a true measurement of the
subsidiary's separation.
A consideration of the subsidiary shareholding may be a useful
aid in deciding the question of separateness. Although Mueller has
suggested that corporate criminal responsibility has grown up with
no rationale at all, 11 2 he also suggests that a basic rationale for its
existence is to reach and sanction the shareholders of the
company."13 Whether this be true or not, it may help decide the
problem before us. First, if the court looked to the shareholding of
the subsidiary, it would be able to see how great a control the parent
company actually had over the policy and actions of the subsidiary.
Compare a parent holding of 51% with one of 98%.114 Secondly, if
the aim of the imposition of the criminal sanction is to reach the
pockets of the shareholders, a knowledge of shareholdings could

110. For an analgous view, see Wood v. U.S., supra, note 59, at 57.
111. For example, where companies decide to evade tax or anticombine
restrictions, the steps taken may involve a separate legal entity for conspiracy
purposes.
112. Mueller, supra, note 92, at 23:
"Itis safe to say that, for the most part, the law has proceeded without rationale
whatsoever ....
It simply rests on an assumption that such liability is a
necessary and useful thing."
Leigh, supra, note 154, concludes that if there is any rationale, it is certainly hard
to find, (Ch. 8 and at page 43) and that there is no good reason why corporate
criminal liability should not be abolished (at 185).
113. Id., at 39 ff. This is also recognized by Leigh, supra, note 154, at 143 ff. For
other justifications, see Leigh, id., at 150 ff., and Fisse, "Consumer Protection
And Corporate Criminal Responsibility", supra, note 10. See also the discussions
in the Working Papersof the National Commission on Reform of FederalCriminal
Laws, supra, note 17, volume 1 at 188-190; English Law Commission, Working
Paper No. 44, Codification of the Criminal Law, General Principles, Criminal
Liability of Corporations, supra, note 5, at paras. 46-7; Note, "Developments in
the Law: Criminal Conspiracy", supra, note 1, at 1001.
114. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 593. McQuade,
supra, note 109, at 212-3 distinguishes between control by ownership, and control
by agreement based on percentage of shareholding. Timken is an example of
control by agreement: Krause, "The Multi-Corporate International Business under
Section 1 of The Sherman Act - Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Revisited" (1962),
17 Bus. Law. 912 at 930-932, 935.
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assist in a decision as to the effectiveness of the imposition of any
sanction. 115
If one accepts that the notion of control becomes determinative,
then the utility of looking to shareholdings may be illustrated by S.
Berendson Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners. 116 In that case,
X Co. had an issued capital of 1000 shares which each carried one
vote. The directors held 410 shares and a Danish company held 590
shares. The question was whether the directors of X Co. had a
"controlling interest" in X Co. It was proved that Y, a director of
X Co., held a majority of shares in the Danish company. The Court
of Appeal held that it could look to the share registers of both
companies to decide the question of control. In Unit Construction
Co. Ltd. v. Bullock, 117 the question was where a company was
resident. The House of Lords ignored the articles of association, the
place of incorporation, and legal form and looked to where the
management really took place.
It must be emphasised that the factors looked to must reflect
reality. Appearances are open to evasive action. If it be held lightly
that a company may conspire with its subsidiaries, then the parent
may easily reorganize as a departmental structure. Poller v.
C.B.S. 118 holds that, in America at least, a company cannot
conspire with its own unincorporated, subdivisions. Consistent
piercing of the corporate veil will hamper evasion by means of
corporate reorganization. Note also, that the tendency in such cases
as McDonnell 1 9 has been to look to reality. If the subsidiary is in
fact under the thumb of its parent, then its illegal policies or actions
will be dictated by that company. Corporate decision making in
such cases is "a joint deliberative and consultative process" 120 and
should be recognized as such.
115. See Krause, id., at 930-932, and the cases there cited: U.S. v. Pan American
World Airways Inc. (1961), 193 F. Supp. 18, (S.D.N.Y.); American T. C. P.
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. (1955), 127 F. Supp. 208, (S.D.N.Y.).
116. [1958]Ch. 1, (C.A.).
117. [1960] A.C. 351. See also Woods, supra, note 43, and the English cases

cited above, note 48.
118. supra, note, 101. The case was reversed but not on conspiracy. (1962), 368
U.S. 464 at 469 n.4:
"We do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that under C.B.S. corporate
arrangement of divisions, with separate officers and autonomy in each, the
divisions came within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries."
119. Supra, note 44.
120. Leigh, The CriminalLiability of Corporationsin English Law, supra, note 5,

at 56, citing Berle, "The Theory of Enterprise Entity" (1947), 47 CoI.L.R. 343.
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(B) Other CanadianAnti-Combine Cases
While Dominion Coal and Steel 121 remains the sole judicial
discussion in Canada of the problem of inter-corporate conspiracy,
two other cases may be cited as examples of the problem, in which
lack of plurality was either not argued or dismissed out of hand.
In R. v. Container Materials Ltd., ' 22 a number of companies
were charged with conspiracy in restraint of trade. Several
companies in the paper carton manufacturing industry, decided to
form a company which would have power to regulate and control all
their business in Canada, and Container Materials Ltd. was a
company revived by the conspirators for this purpose. All the
conspirators held between them all the shares of the company in
proportion to the amount of business done in Canada and all were
represented on the board. The president of Container Materials Ltd.
was the only person not a director of another company. 123 Although
the point was not dealt with, how can it be said that Container
Materials Ltd. conspired with the holding companies? How could it
be said to have any real existence separate from that of its parent
companies?
In R. v. Eddy Match Co. Ltd., 12 4 the Eddy Match Company set
out to monopolize the Canadian match market. The parties to the
alleged combine eventually charged were: Commonwealth Match
Co., Canada Match Co., Valcourt Co. Ltd., all wholly owned
subsidiaries of Eddy Match Co., and Federal Match Co., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Valcourt Co. Ltd. It is unclear from the case
whether it was necessary to establish two or more parties to
constitute the offence but the court did imply that it regarded these
companies as separate persons.12 5 To hold that these companies
were separate would be to completely ignore reality and, if the
121. Supra, note 105.

122. The facts discussed are taken from (1940), 74 C.C.C. 113, (Ont. S.C.). See
also the reports of the case as it was appealed: (1939), 72 C.C.C. 383, (Ont. S.C.);
(1941), 76 C.C.C. 18, (Ont. C.A.); (1942), 77 C.C.C. 129, (S.C.C.).
123. Id., at 135.
124. (1951-2), 13 C.R. 217, 268, (Que. K.B.). See also R. v. McGavin Bakeries

[1950] 2 W.W.R. 735 at 749, (B.C.S.C.).
125. Id., at 218 - charged with being "parties" to the combine; id., at 287 referred to as "various persons". The question of whether plurality was required is
unclear; id., at 288:
"Thus, the legislature has willed that no person, neither corporation nor
individual, may with impunity, participate or assist in formation or operation of
an illegal combine .... "
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charge was conspiracy, it is submitted that no plurality could be
established between the companies.
The problem in all these cases is that the closer the company
comes to achieving a perfect combine or monopoly, the closer it
comes to being immune from a conspiracy charge as other possible
co-conspirators are eliminated. This emphasizes the lack of utility in
the conspiracy concept in the anti-combine field.
(C) A Note on American Anti-Trust

A number of American cases in the anti-trust area have raised, but
certainly not answered, the problem of inter-corporate conspiracy.
In a succession of prosecutions under the Sherman Act, parent and
subsidiary companies have been charged with conspiring with each
other. 1 26 However, while these cases on their face appear to hold
that a company may, under the Sherman Act, conspire with its
wholly owned subsidiary, 127 most commentators argue that the
decisions are either wrong or irrelevant. 128 It is impossible to glean
from these cases and the academic discussion prompted by them any
rational view as to whether a company can conspire with its owned
126. U.S. v. General Motors Corp. (1941), 121 F.2d. 376, (C.C.A., Seventh
Circuit), noted in (1942), 30 Calif.L.R. 204, (1942), 10 Geo.Wash.L.R. 882,
(1942), 17 Ind.L.J. 255, (1942), 21 N.C.L.R. 1 (1943), 27 Mar.L.R. 158; U.S. v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1947), 332 U.S. 218, noted in (1948), 32 Minn. L.R. 521; U.S.
v. Columbia Steel Co. (1948), 334 U.S. 495; Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons (1951), supra, note 109, noted in (1951), 50 Col.L.R. 1144; Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. U.S., supra, note 114, noted in (1952), 100 U.Pa.L.R. 1006;
Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Winckler and Smith CitrusProductsCo. (1961), 370 U.S.
19. The literature is quite immense. Useful references are: Kramer, supra, note 96,
Rahl, supra, note 3; Note, "The Sherman Act and Multi-Corporate Single Traders:
Competition Among Affiliates" (1952), 100 U.Pa.L.R. 1006; Comment,
"Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under The Sherman Act", supra, note 90; Note,
"The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy" (1954), 54 Col.L.R. 1108; McQuade,
supra, note 109, Note, "Recent Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy"
supra, note 1, at 1000 ff.; Barndt, supra, note 94, Krause, supra, note 114,
Stengel, supra, note 56.
127. There are numerous dicta to this effect in the cases cited ibid. These dicta are
quoted and extensively discussed in the literature surrounding this area.
128. Thus, for example, McQuade, id., at 212 states:
"An attempt either to classify these eight cases or to theorize about an intra
enterprise conspiracy doctrine suggested by them is not very rewarding"
Stengel, ibid., among others, concludes that the cases and commentators are so
ambiguous and confusing, that the question should be decided afresh. At 22 ff., he
rejects as useless or meaningless, the tests proposed or discussed by authority. The
wide agreement among the authority ited ibid., makes the American experience,
of only marginal relevance, totally useless, except as discussed below.
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or controlled subsidiaries. 129 This has possibly been due to the
Sherman Act itself although that Act employs the concept of
conspiracy. 130
What does emerge from a long, complex, and most unhelpful
discussion, is the view that the rules of inter-corporate conspiracy
may necessarily be affected by the rules that govern the possible
131
existence of conspiracy between a company and its directors.
This turns on the notion of evasion. If it be held that a company may
not conspire with its directors, as Anglo-Canadian law does, then a
holding that a company may properly be held to conspire with its
subsidiaries would lead to evasion by corporate reorganization.
Instead of using subsidiaries, a company could organize into
unincorporated subdivisions. Ease of evasion would render the rule
unusable. 131a
If it be held that a company cannot conspire with its wholly
owned subsidiaries but may conspire with a company over which it
does not hold total control (whatever that may mean), then evasion
129 Ibid. See, for example, Comment, "Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the
Sherman Act", Supra. note 90 at 388, where it is argued that the defence of
"single corporate form" does not relate to conspiracy at all, but to the effects of
the monopoly charged.
130. See Note, "Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy", supra, note 1
at 1002-3.
131. This emerges particularly from Kramer, supra, note 96, and Rahl, supra,
note 3. See also Note, id., at 1001: "It seems, however, that even though closely
related corporations should not be considered separate entities in determining the
existence of a conspiracy, the Courts' actions do not offend the requirement that
there be two parties. Under common-law principles it seems that there may be a
conspiracy among officers and agents of one corporation, acting within the scope of
their authority, and that a penalty may properly be assessed against the corporation
for such a conspiracy." See also id., at 1003. Compare Stengel, supra, note 56,
who concludes that a company cannot conspire with its agents, (6-8) and also that a
company cannot conspire with its subsidiaries. See also Note, "The Sherman Act
and Multi-Corporate Single Traders: Competition Among Affiliates", supra, note
121 at 1011: "The inter-corporate conspiracy doctrine is therefore well settled
while the intra-corporate doctrine is still doubtful for lack of clear precedent.
Because of the logical and factual relation between them perhaps consistency
would demand they coincide, so that a conspiracy might be found as readily within
a single corporation as it is among affiliated corporations."
And Bamdt, supra, note 94 at 198-9.
At 198: "Thus, whether an enterprise is operated as a simple corporation, as a
corporate family, or as a corporation with branches, the result should be the
same in all events other then where a single officer is acting."
131a. This argument is made by Rahl, supra, note 3 at 765:
"The corporate family might first try evasion by abandoning separate entities.
This development in turn would invite the finding of conspiracy between the
single corporation and one or more of its officers and directors."
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would not be so easy since in order to attract the defence that the
company conspired with itself there would have to be a close
relation between the subsidiaires' "directors" and the parents'
"directors" to equate the two. This would still be so if the
subsidiary was dissolved and its functions absorbed into the parent.
In other words, evasion is easier the more control the parent has
over the subsidiary.

(D) Conclusion
It is submitted that as a general rule, there can be no conspiracy
between a parent company and its subsidiary, and, as a corollary,
between a subsidiary and a subsidiary. The question for the courts
is: when is a subsidiary a subsidiary? It is submitted that the correct
approach is to begin with the Anglo-Canadian rule that a company
cannot conspire with its directors, and then ask: when does a
company become analagous to a director? It is submitted that the
question may be answered in the same way in both cases: by means
of the accepted "brains and nerve centre" test.
Where the parent company nominates or shares directors for the
subsidiary company or has a majority vote or shareholding, then it is
submitted that the "brains and nerve centre" of the subsidiary are
the same as those of the parent. Control must be regarded as vital
since a subsidiary and parent need not have an interlocking
directorate for the latter to dictate the policy and actions of the
former. The factors discussed above may be helpful in deciding
whether the "brain and nerve centre" of the subsidiary is the
parent. There is no easy evasion of this test, which also leads to
consistent law.
The basis of the suggested test is that there is no real difference,
in the context of the requirement of plurality in conspiracy, between
a director of the company and a wholly owned subsidiary. The
reason for defining each is, however different. In the case of the
director, the plurality requirement is a problem, because his intent is
imputed to the company. In the case of the subsidiary, the plurality
requirement is a problem because the parent's intent is imputed to
the subsidiary, since, in reality, only one decision is made. But, just
as there is difficulty in deciding whether an employee is a director
the further down the corporate hierarchy one moves, there is a
similar difficulty the closer aligned one company is to another. The
peculiar nature of the Sherman Act colours the American discussion
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of intercorporate conspiracy and thus renders all but basic
conceptual approaches to the problem irrelevant. In the AngloCanadian context, the law has yet to decide if there is a problem
and, if so, how to deal with it. It has been the aim of the preceding
discussion to suggest an answer.
(6) Conclusions
While the subjective element of conspiracy raises problems where
conspiracy is charged against a company, it has been seen that the
law on the topic is, at base, well settled, although the application of
the law to the particular case may raise problems with respect to a
charge of any offence. However, the objective element, the
requisite plurality, is barely recognized as a problem in some areas
and it is upon the objective element that the discussion has centered.
It is proposed in this conclusion to look at the application of the
crime of conspiracy to the company, as to the objective element, in
general terms: first, in light of the rationales of the crime of
conspiracy, and secondly, to evaluate the utility of the crime as
applied to the company.
The dual rationales of the crime of conspiracy may be
summarized thus: (a) The attempt rationale: when persons conspire
to commit an unlawful act, they are, in essence, about to attempt the
commission of that unlawful act. Where the unlawful act is a crime,
the crime of conspiracy may be seen as an adjunct to the crime of
attempt, as it reaches out to punish and deter conduct preparatory to
the commission of a crime.' 3 2 (b) The social danger rationale:
when persons agree together to commit an unlawful act, then they
represent a significant danger to society for reasons of mutual
encouragement, weight of numbers and so on. This may make the
commission of a specific crime more likely or may make the
commission of any crime more likely. Thus, on this rationale, the
object of conspiracy need not be criminal to attract legal
33
sanction. 1
132. See Wright, The Law of CriminalConspiraciesand Agreements, supra, note
1 at 68: Smith and Hogan, CriminalLaw (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed., 1969) at
271; Commentary on the Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 10, (1960), at
96-7; Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of FederalCriminal
Laws, supra, note 17, Volume 1, at 381; Note, "Developments in the Law:
Criminal Conspiracy" supra, note 1 at 924-5.
133. Wright, id., at 68; Model Penal Code, id., at 98-99; The English Criminal
Law Commission, Seventh Report, (London: H.M.S.O., 1843) at 90; Holdsworth,
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The social danger rationale has been vigorously and cogently
attacked and has lost much of its credibility.1 34 However, it is a
mistake to assume that the rationales are quite distinct and that the
attempt rationale remains intact. The two rationales merge into a
general assertion that an agreement to commit a crime poses a
danger to society. A basic reason for the punishing of attempts lies
in the danger to society created by the attempt since the actor is held
to be sufficiently proximate that his actions will result, or are likely
to result, in socially harmful consequences. 13 5 Conspiracy reaches
back further into preparation than does attempt. The basis for this
must rest upon the fact that agreement makes conduct, insufficient
to constitute attempt, socially dangerous. 136 It has been observed
that the attempt rationale focuses upon the social danger posed by
the object of the conspiracy, whereas the social danger rationale
1 37
looks to the increased criminal power inherent in a combination.
However, it is proposed to examine the situations discussed above
in light of the concept of social danger on the assumption that it is
the true basis of the crime of conspiracy.
As we have seen, the law denies that a company may conspire
with one director. It is submitted that this is the correct result.
Where the conduct of the director is yet insufficient to constitute an
attempt, no additional danger is present due to his status as a
director. This is particularly obvious in "one man company" cases.
The company is only a tool or weapon to help effect the criminal
"Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Process" (1921), 37 L.Q.R. 462 at 467; Note,
(1948), 62 H.L.R. at 283; Note, id., at 924; Goodhart, "The Shaw Case: The Law
and Public Morals" (1961), 77 L.Q.R. 560 at 564. The rationale can be the only
explanation of Shaw v. D.P.P. [1961] 2 All E.R. 446, (H.L.); Knuller v. D.P.P.
[197212 All E.R. 898, (H.L.), since no crime was ever contemplated or attempted.
134. Glanville Williams, CriminalLaw: The General Part,supra, note 1, at 711;
Sayre, "Criminal Conspiracy" (1922), 35 H.L.R. 393 at 409-411, 427.
135. See Note, "Developments in The Law: Criminal Conspiracy" supra, note 1,
at 922. Hence the dangerous proximity rule in attempt: Hyde v. U.S. (1912), 225
U.S. 347 at 388 (dissent), per Holmes J. See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy
(1897), 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770.
136. Note, id., at 924:
...... as action toward a criminal end nears execution, a point is reached at
which the increasing risk to society is thought to outweigh the diminishing
likelihood of a change of heart or of a misreading of intent, and at this point
mere "preparation" becomes punishable as "attempt". When the defendant
has chosen to act in concert with others, rather than to act alone, the point of
justifiable intervention is reached at an earlier stage."
137. Id., at 924-5 called the "specific object" and "general danger" rationales
respectively.
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a single person is not punishable for intending to
intent. Thus: "....
perform an act merely becuase he has at hand to effect his intent
means which can cause greater harm than could be produced were
these means lacking."1 38 A similar reasoning applies to invalidate the
conviction in ElectricalContractors.
Where conspiracy is alleged between a company and two or more
of its directors, an argument may be made either way. On the one
hand, it could be argued that the real addition is one human mind
and the danger is a result of the combination of two human minds,
while the company remains a tool. Thus, there should be conspiracy
only as between two directors. If such reasoning applies throughout
the area, then the criminal sanction of conspiracy should rarely be
applied to the company. On the other hand, it could be argued that
the company should be responsible; it is involved, although by
fiction, and that since the company in fact adds power to 39the
criminal plot, it should at least be a permissible co-conspirator.1
It is submitted that the rationale only extends to human actors,
and that it is a rare case when the addition of the company can be
justified under it. Such a case may be where another director is
unindictable for some reason and the company becomes involved
through the person of that director. Even in such a case, the
rationale is weak. Thus, since mutual encouragement and the other
components of social danger are directed toward human actors, the
conspiracy rationale is hard to apply to an artificial legal person.
It was suggested above that a parent company may conspire with
a subsidiary company only where the "brains and nerve centre" of
the subsidiary are different from those of the parent. In such a case,
the rationale justifies the rule since, in that case, a plurality of
human actors is present as represented by their respective
companies. Where overlap is partial, the rationale will also be
partial and will depend upon an individual assessment of increased
social danger.
It is submitted that a definite pattern emerges from the
consideration of the applicability of the rationale or rationales of
138. id., at 952. The author continued:
"The corporation seems an inanimate object analogous to a bank or a trust.
Plurality in the context of conspiracy should be viewed as a plurality of human
minds, each of which is able to contribute consciously to the furtherance of the
conspiracy. This reasoning applies equally well under the general danger
rationale."
139. So argued by Kramer, supra, note 96 at 131, and Note id., at 953.
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criminal conspiracy in relation to corporate crime. The rationale
focuses on individuals for the basic reason that it was designed to
apply to individuals. 140 It was not designed and developed to apply
to a company. The technical and conceptual difficulties that emerge
arise from the same cause. Thus, McDonald has commented: "This
paper has attempted to indicate how the traditional concepts of the
criminal law have been strained in the attempt to adapt them to
twentieth century commerce and forms of business organization." 141
Thus also, McQuade observed in the context of American anti-trust:
"Attempting to solve the problem with fictional conspiracies will
only create new headaches." ' 142 The technical and conceptual
difficulties which arise when a company is charged with conspiracy
arise because the law of conspiracy was developed for individuals.
This is evidenced by the fact that the rationales for the crime focus
upon individual human actors. The problem is not helped by a
demonstrable uncertainty whether companies should be subject to
43
criminal responsibility and if so, to what extent. 1
It is therefore submitted that conspiracy should not be invoked
against the company, but prosecutors should rather reach to apply
criminal sanctions to the individual actors, by conspiracy or
substantive criminal law. A commentator has observed: "A perhaps
more realistic approach would treat intra-corporate conspiracy as
involving an agreement among the individuals in charge who use
the corporations as instrumentalities for unlawful conduct." 144 Then,
140 This is clear from the history of the crime, which predates the modem
company by seven hundred years. The point is reinforced by Mueller, supra, note
92 at 36:
"The common law is a creation by individuals for individuals. Organized
aggregations of private individuals had little influence on its makeup. They
were neither subjects, nor objects of the law to any material extent. In fact,
when centuries after the incept the private body corporate made its appearance
on the scene, the machinery of the common law was perplexed."
141. McDonald, supra, note 84 at 92.
142. McQuade, supra, note 109 at 215. Similar points are made in U.S. literature
by Rahl, supra, note 3: Comment, "Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the
Sherman Act supra, note 90 at 388; Stengel, supra, note 56.
143. Leigh, for example, says "No convincing case can be made out for the
retention of corporate criminal liability as a general principle of criminal law".
(supra, note 5) at 185. For a contrary view, see The English Law Commission,
Working Paper No. 44, Codification of the Criminal Law, General Principles,
CriminalLiability of Corporations,supra, notes, at para. 24; Andrews, supra, note
3 at 95 ff. See also supra, notes 112-1 13.
144. Note, "The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy", supra, note 126 at 1125.
For similar views, see Leigh, id., at 185-6, and Andrews, id., at 94. "That part of
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and only then, would difficult conceptual and technical problems be
"relegated to the attention of history." 14 5 It is therefore
recommended that concerted corporate illegality should be attacked,
if at all, by applying the criminal sanction to the human actors or by
46
using the substantive criminal law against the company.'
Conceivably, the ingenuity of man may devise a combined action
offence in particular statutes designed to by-pass the word
"conspiracy" and the problems it conjures.
the criminal law which is dependent on a concept of delinquency was not fashioned
for corporate bodies."
145. Leigh,supra, note 5, at 186.
146. See Krause, supra, note 114, at 929 n. 77:
"Might it not be argued that the real shortcoming of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act is not so much its appreciation, under certain circumstances, to the
multi-corporate enterprise, but its non-application, under similar circumstances
to the single enterprises?"
See, for the unilateral approach of the Model Penal Code, which may help solv6 the
problem, Wechsler, Jones and Kom, "The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation and
Conspiracy" (1961), 61 Col. L.R. 957 at 965-7.
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